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It may seem immodest to reflect on one’s own work by christening 
it with an eponymous title, but readers with a historical bent will, I 
hope, appreciate the pun.  “Madisonian” fair use refers not (only) to me, 
but to the Father of the American Constitution, James Madison.  The 
separation of powers principle that he held dear and that animates the 
structure of the American federal government is also at work, in an 
important if distinct and metaphorical way, in copyright.  Fair use is in 
many respects copyright’s clearest expression of a social and cultural 
separation of powers.  Because that proposition is not clearly the focus 
of the article that this brief essay reflects on, Rewriting Fair Use and the 
Future of Copyright Reform,1 for the next few pages I want to explain 
where that article came from, how it signifies a kind of copyright 
separation of powers principle, how that principle has been felt in fair 
use law and policy in recent years, and what that means for the future of 
copyright. 
I. FAIR USE SCHOLARSHIP IN CONTEXT 
Rewriting Fair Use distilled and repurposed a much longer and 
denser work on fair use that I published in the William & Mary Law 
Review in 2004, titled A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use,2 which 
I refer to as Patterns.  The core of the argument of Patterns and 
Rewriting Fair Use was and remains that the law and policy of fair use 
should align with the law and policy of copyright generally, namely the 
 

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1 Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO 
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provisioning of creative works for the benefit of society as a whole, and 
that fair use long had been and should be interpreted to provide legal 
protection—freedom from the exclusive rights of the copyright owner—
for individuals and their works if the works were produced as part of an 
identifiable and provable “pattern” of activity by some group, that is, as 
part of a “social practice.”  In Patterns, I collected and synthesized an 
array of arguments from social science literatures that, in the aggregate, 
suggest that people organized around these patterns are probabilistically 
likely to produce creative things.  My goal was to contrast the 
institutional matrices of these patterns with the institutional matrices of 
the markets that otherwise produce and allocate interests in copyrighted 
works.  Creative works are produced and distributed by at least two 
distinct but complementary institutional systems in society.  One is a set 
of markets for copyrighted works, supported legally by a robust cluster 
of exclusive rights.  A second is a set of patterned social practices, 
supported legally by a robust cluster of exclusions and exemptions from 
exclusive rights, including fair use (in the United States) and various 
doctrines defining and protecting the public domain.3  Neither of these 
institutional systems is wholly independent of the other.  They represent 
poles on an institutional continuum.  But when copyright courts need to 
resolve infringement disputes, I argued, the choice is often between 
idealized versions of these two models—rather than a choice between 
two competing claims of individual right, as almost everyone associated 
with the copyright system otherwise tends to assume.  A defendant who 
interferes in the operation of a market is ordinarily an infringer; a 
defendant who is participating in a different institution, one governed by 
the internal dynamics of a patterned social practice, ordinarily engages 
in fair use. 
In Patterns, I argued that this construction of fair use was 
historically accurate, normatively desirable and—importantly—a means 
to discern a predictable conceptual framework for applying the doctrine. 
Rewriting Fair Use followed from an invitation to put that 
argument into a more conventional law reform format, as part of the 
Modest Proposals conferences hosted by the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law at Yeshiva University.  Though the premise of Modest 
Proposals may have been for scholars to suggest minor tweaks to 
intellectual property statutes to effect important change, my update of 
Patterns was modest in Swift’s sense.  It was certainly possible to put a 
pattern-oriented approach to fair use into statutory form, and the paper 
and accompanying presentation did just that.  The proposal, however, 
 
3 This does not exhaust the inventory of systems and models for producing and distributing 
creative things.  The iconoclast solo creator, sometimes referred to as the source of the trope of 
the “romantic author,” plays a role, for example.  For a strong philosophical justification of the 
role of the individual artist in copyright, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking 
Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010). 
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was modest only in an ironic way. 
As I expected, at the conference itself my proposal proved 
sufficiently disruptive to settled understandings of fair use and to 
political and ideological commitments to the existing copyright regime 
that it was roundly criticized for its political and conceptual 
infeasibility.  That critique came from all sides of the spectrum of 
copyright opinion: from a leading member of the public interest 
community advocating for copyright reform (who feared that the 
proposal would invite a larger retreat from gains to user rights made 
possible by open-ended, unpredictable legal standards); from a leading 
member of the corps of Congressional aides charged with managing 
proposed changes to copyright law (who dismissed any effort to modify 
fair use that did not enlist the support of content industries, on suspicion 
that unilateral proposals would expand user rights); and from a leading 
scholar of international copyright (who was concerned that the proposal 
was inconsistent with American obligations under the Berne 
Convention).  It was clear from the beginning, in other words, that the 
future of the pattern-oriented argument, like the future of fair use itself, 
does not lie in the hands of decision-makers and policymakers typically 
charged with law reform.  No one expressed an interest in advancing the 
argument in conventional law reform terms. 
Despite the proposal’s lack of traction in conventional terms (or 
perhaps, because of it), the proposal embodies a Madisonian separation 
of powers theme, in three senses.  The first is its framing fair use in 
institutional terms, rather than in individual terms.  Second is its 
examining fair use in terms of a separation or identity of institutions.  
Third is its express concern with the dual goals of stability and 
predictability in government and governance, on the one hand, and 
flexibility in the administration of the system, to deal with evolving 
goals, interests, technologies, and social conditions, on the other.  The 
first two points can be taken together in the following way.  The fair use 
defense historically has involved comparing the work produced or 
distributed by the copyright defendant to the work owned by the 
plaintiff, a work-to-work and individual-to-individual comparison.  
Rewriting Fair Use proposed a different lens, one that contrasts the 
social and cultural (that is, institutional) context of the defendant’s 
production (that is, process as well as product) to the comparable 
context of the plaintiff’s work.  If both plaintiff and defendant are in and 
of the same institution (typically, both would be part of copyright 
markets), then there is ordinarily no fair use.  If the plaintiff and the 
defendant are embedded in different institutions, then there is a strong 
case for fair use.4  There is a metaphorically Madisonian separation of 
 
4 As I have expressed the point here, the argument is consistent with, though in certain key 
respects different from, the argument regarding the weight to be given “fair use markets” 
presented recently by Wendy Gordon, discussing the Second Circuit’s reliance on that concept in 
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powers at work in that logic, in the sense that no single social or cultural 
institution (the market, defined by the exclusive rights that constitute 
copyright ownership) does or should dominate control of production of 
and access to copyrighted works.  Pattern-based or social practice-based 
groups of creators constitute important and powerful institutional forces 
in their own rights and as matrices for agency exercised by individuals 
within them.  Recognizing those institutions and enabling them as 
institutional counterweights and complements to other copyright 
institutions, via fair use (and, perhaps, via other means), is an important 
way to combat what Madison called, in the American Constitutional 
context, tyranny.5  The third point, the stress on balancing flexibility and 
predictability, emerges plausibly from precisely that institutional 
framework.  Patterns of activity are grounded in social groups that are, 
largely by definition, stable across time, though not perfectly so.  
Patterns identified mechanisms through which fair use can adopt and 
evolve over time, even against a relatively stable background.6  As a 
matter of institutional choice, fair use is at least as much about what 
people actually do as it is about the narratives, ideologies, and legal 
institutions of copyright itself.  Those two things are closely related, but 
they are also separate, and fair use participates in maintaining them at 
an engaged but respectful, and stable yet flexible, distance from one 
another. 
II. FAIR USE SCHOLARSHIP AND LITIGATION 
What has the impact and later history of the Madisonian proposal 
consisted of? 
 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).  See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814, 
1830-32 (2011). 
5 I do not want the metaphor to run away with the argument.  But if the separation of powers idea 
has intellectual legs, then exploring it further might begin with considering in greater depth links 
and contrasts between copyright markets and a First Amendment or free speech-based 
“marketplace of ideas.”  Justice Holmes had much to do with promoting the single market 
metaphor in both copyright and free speech contexts, and the metaphor has become a nearly 
totalizing ideal of democratic government.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (relying on the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor as a primary 
means of combating harmful speech); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 
(1903) (disclaiming a judicial role in evaluating legal protection for arguably trivial works of 
authorship, under what is now referred to as the “aesthetic non-discrimination principle”).  I 
suggest the Madisonian separation of powers metaphor as an alternative conception of democratic 
principles in copyright, that is, as a partial rejection of the market framework altogether rather 
than as a substitute for the common “limited monopoly” view of copyright law.  In a related vein, 
see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 
(1996) (suggesting an alternative conception of the market model underlying copyright, inspired 
by democratic theory). 
6 I am reminded of the twentieth century Realist project of reforming commercial law in the 
image of customary commercial practice and of the reality that no matter how much custom is 
baked into the Uniform Commercial Code, the practice itself is just dynamic enough that it would 
and should in some key respects escape capture.  See Michael J. Madison, Some Optimism About 
Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 351, 351 (2010) (“Like any 
institution adapted for human use, law tracks and simplifies patterns of behavior,” with references 
to Jorge Luis Borges and Lewis Carroll). 
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In terms of copyright litigation itself, it cannot be said that the 
work has had any noticeable effect, but as Neil Netanel has shown 
persuasively,7 since 2005 (when Rewriting Fair Use was published) 
courts applying the fair use doctrine have shifted their emphasis 
decisively to application of the “transformative use” consideration first 
made salient by the Supreme Court in 1994.8  It is fair to say that 
Patterns captured a sense of creativity as the engine of fair use, and that 
same sense emerged elsewhere around the same time and has gathered 
momentum in the courts ever since. 
Netanel uses a handful of leading cases as exemplary illustrations 
of his thesis: Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd.9 
(involving reproductions of concert posters in an art book); Blanch v. 
Koons10 (involving the postmodernism of the painter and sculptor Jeff 
Koons); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.11 (implicating Google’s 
search technology); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC12 (the 
Turnitin case); Salinger v. Colting13 (the Catcher in the Rye case); 
Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books14 (involving the 
Harry Potter Lexicon); and Gaylord v. United States15 (addressing a 
postage stamp that used a photograph of a copyrighted public 
memorial).  Netanel does a thorough job of explaining how the doctrine 
of transformative use does a lot of work in each of those cases, whether 
or not he or anyone else thinks that any particular case was correctly 
decided.  I share the view expressed by some other scholars that the 
doctrine of transformative use as such is freighted with too many 
meanings to be of real value in explaining what courts should do in 
these cases.16  But interest in the transformative use concept is 
consistent with the proposition that fair use, like copyright as a whole, 
should be understood and applied as a system for encouraging, 
supporting, and rewarding people and firms who produce creative 
things. 
Equally interesting has been the growing body of copyright 
scholarship that adopts and extends some of the methods of Patterns 
and Rewriting Fair Use in service of exploring and possibly critiquing 
the widespread popular assumption (and assumption in many parts of 
the copyright system) that fair use is an unpredictable, case-specific 
doctrine.  In the years after the Supreme Court decided its last major fair 
 
7 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 
(2011). 
8 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
9 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
10 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
11 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
12 A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC , 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
13 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
14 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
15 Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
16 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They Seem 
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 251 (1998). 
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use case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., fair use scholarship 
struggled to make sense of the Court’s emphasis on transformative use 
and struggled in particular with claims of so-called personal or private 
use in the context of emerging Internet technologies.  That work 
operated against a backdrop of an economic model of fair use inherited 
from a seminal piece of legal scholarship, Wendy Gordon’s Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and its Predecessors.17  The result of that post-Campbell 
scholarship was, largely, confirmation of an intuition that deviations 
from a market-oriented paradigm for fair use were idiosyncratic and 
unpredictable, if not outright random.18 Patterns and Rewriting Fair 
Use were leading parts of a revival of interest in the empirics of fair use, 
intended in part to explore the possibility that fair use is saner, and saner 
on non-market principles, than its critics believe. 
My own methods were relatively simple: I collected appellate 
cases and clustered them using a qualitative framework, according to 
my reading of the social or cultural patterns embedded (or claimed to be 
embedded) in each of them.  (The clusters, in other words, partly 
represented groups of like cases but more importantly signified 
underlying patterns of social activity.)  Other copyright scholars have 
embarked on much more ambitious and sophisticated empirical 
investigations of fair use.  Neil Netanel’s work, mentioned above, is the 
most recent of these.  Other major contributions include work by Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005,19 looking at the extent to which copyright courts rely on each of 
the four principal statutory fair use “factors”; Matthew Sag, Predicting 
Fair Use20 (the same); and Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses.21  
Samuelson’s article argues that fair use cases can be clustered by type, 
and her proposed clusters align closely with the patterns developed in 
Patterns.  She relies on identifying the structure of disputes, on judicial 
logic, and on policy narratives of copyright somewhat more than on 
independent patterns of creative conduct.  All three scholars rely on 
quantitative analysis to a greater or lesser extent.  All three largely 
confirm the proposition argued in Patterns and again in Rewriting Fair 
Use.  The fair use doctrine is metaphorically Madisonian: flexible, yet 
 
17 Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).  An example of excellent 
work in this vein is Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in 
an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). 
18 See, e.g., David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) (“Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than 
the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot 
would be the same.”). 
19 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 573 (2008). 
20 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769130. 
21 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
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more coherent, predictable, and stable than casual observers believe. 
III. FAIR USE BEYOND THE COURTS AND THE LAW REVIEWS 
Demonstrating that fair use is more coherent than popularly 
believed is one thing; changing the behavior of legal institutions so that 
the underlying theory and corresponding evidence are incorporated 
explicitly into the copyright system is something else entirely.  What the 
scholars discussed above have argued, in effect, is that both supporters 
and critics of the current copyright landscape ought to look not at what 
legal institutions say, but at what they do.  Lawyers, judges, and even 
some policymakers are accustomed to that sort of reasoning and 
therefore have little trouble leading a kind of double life, publicly 
analyzing fair use cases by applying the four statutory factors on a case-
specific basis but coming over time to a series of results that reveals an 
underlying if imperfect predictability.  But the folks who are often most 
directly affected by contemporary copyright law, ordinary creators and 
users of copyrighted works who rely on the law as well as on their own 
casual understandings of the law, are not helped by that view.  When 
legal language in particular cases diverges from legal outcomes, when 
the pattern of cases over time reveals a predictability that cannot be 
discerned in the here and now, there is at least a lot of head scratching 
and at worst a lot of misguided avoided creativity, unneeded licensing 
and/or threats of litigation, and general anxiety and stress. 
This, the realm of actual practice, is where a Madisonian 
separation of powers theme has helped fair use to have a productive 
impact in recent years, at least in a preliminary sense.  In a handful of 
key respects, fair use has been liberated (separated) from its formal role 
as a shield for the interests of some defendants in copyright litigation 
and has been used as a sword for the interests of groups of creative 
people who are trying to practice their arts and their crafts. 
The most robust version of this approach has been implemented by 
scholars at American University’s Washington College of Law and 
Center for Social Media, who since 2005 have produced and published 
a series of Statements of Best Practices in Fair Use for a variety of 
creative communities.22  The production of each of these Statements, 
intended as guides for non-lawyers, follows a similar path: partnership 
with entities and organizations that represent members of the relevant 
community; a lengthy series of interviews and meetings with members 
of the community to determine the community’s own understanding of 
 
22 The Center’s website, containing all of the relevant materials, is CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use.  The principal investigators are Patricia 
Aufderheide of the Center for Social Media and Peter Jaszi of the Washington College of Law.  
The vision animating this project, and the role that the research presented in the Patterns article 
played in advancing that vision, is described in PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, 
RECLAIMING FAIR USE 71 (2011). 
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its interests and practices relative to the uses of copyrighted works; and 
preparation of document and related materials that fix that 
understanding in writing, with appropriate illustrations and guidelines, 
in the context of background copyright doctrine.23  The results are then 
published back to the community and otherwise distributed publicly.  
To date, the objects and subjects of these Best Practices Statements 
have included documentary filmmakers, producers of online video, 
media literacy educators, communication scholars, producers of open 
courseware, poets, dance archivists, and research librarians.  This is an 
eclectic group of interests, and each project is time-consuming and 
labor-intensive.  But the Statements are both institutionally-based law 
reform and advocacy of a very concrete if unorthodox character.  That 
character consists of giving creators in context (which often includes 
institutional gatekeepers as well as the creators themselves) a type of 
cultural permission to engage in the creativity and acts related to 
creativity that their discipline teaches are fair and appropriate, with a 
lessening of the threat of copyright litigation that hangs over their heads 
in light of unclear or overbroad understandings of the rights of 
copyright owners.  To extend the Madisonian theme, the Statements of 
Best Practices situate the locus of relevant copyright power in 
individuals set firmly within creative communities themselves, rather 
than exclusively among copyright owners.  The metaphorical cultural 
authority of the former reduces somewhat the risk of metaphorical 
tyranny by the latter.  Creative communities are empowered by the tools 
that Madisonian fair use gives them. 
Although there is some anecdotal evidence that the relevant 
creative communities have benefited in terms of being able to produce 
additional creative work,24 the Statements of Best Practices have not 
been free from debate.  Relevant content owners have been skeptical of 
the Statements on the ground that they are unilateral, rather than 
understandings negotiated bilaterally, with (unsurprisingly) copyright 
owners.  Some scholars have expressed concern that the Statements tend 
to lock in backward-looking, customary interpretations of law and 
practice25 and crowd out the radical creator who is untethered to 
community norms; in other words, the Statements blur the descriptive 
aspects of fair use with some versions of normative or aspirational 
aspects of fair use.  The Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA, 
the leading professional journal of the copyright law community, 
 
23 Each of the draft Statements is vetted by a Board of Legal Advisors to ensure that the 
Statement’s recitations and applications of copyright law are consistent with a reasonable 
application of copyright law.  I have been a member of several of these Boards. 
24 See Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: Surprising Success, INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 26, available at http://www.iptoday.com/articles/2007-10-
aufderheide.asp. 
25 The risk of locking-in normatively unattractive bargains over rights is described in general 
terms in James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882 (2007). 
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recently devoted an entire issue of the journal to papers assessing the 
Best Practices “movement.”26 
A second version of the move to shift fair use from its traditional 
institutional settings to new fora is seen in rulemaking proceedings 
before the Librarian of Congress.  The Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”), passed in 1998, established a robust scheme of legal 
protection against circumvention of technological protection measures 
that encrypt or otherwise guard access to copyrighted works, generally 
known as Digital Rights Management, or DRM.  The statute provides 
that fair use is not a defense to a claim of unauthorized circumvention of 
an access control,27 but it also authorized the Librarian of Congress, the 
federal office within which the United States Copyright Office resides, 
to conduct administrative rulemakings every three years to identify 
classes of works that should be exempt from DMCA prohibition on 
circumvention of access controls—that is, works for which the case for 
access outweighs the case for protection from circumvention.  The first 
several rulemakings were narrow in scope.  The Register of Copyrights 
took the position that the statutory language was directed only to classes 
of works, rather than to types of proposed uses of work.  In the most 
recent rulemaking, in 2010, on the recommendation of the Register the 
Librarian announced exemptions that focus more on practices than on 
specific classes of works.28  The most notable of these, in my view, 
because of its overlap with one of the Statements of Best Practices, is an 
exemption to anticircumvention rules for reproduction of small portions 
of DRM-protected content in connection with “vidding,” or producing 
noncommercial video remixes of commercial and noncommercial film 
and television content.  As one commentator observed, this 
interpretation allows at least some forms of fair use finally to survive 
the DMCA’s anticircumvention restrictions.29 
A third context where fair use has found a new audience and new 
impacts is in international copyright discussions.  Fair use hardly 
permeates international copyright; the doctrine itself is formally part of 
the copyright statute only in the United States and, by recent legislation, 
 
26 The symposium papers include Peter Jaszi, Getting to Best Practices - A Personal Voyage 
Around Fair Use, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 315 (2010); Michael J. Madison, Some 
Optimism About Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 351 (2010); 
Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the Context of 
Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 371 (2010); Michael C. Donaldson, 
Fair Use: What a Difference a Decade Makes, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 331 (2010); Jay 
Rosenthal, Best Practices, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 389 (2010). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2006). 
28 See Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, 
Librarian of Cong., Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2008-8 (June 11, 
2010); Rulemaking on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies (July 20, 2010) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201). 
29 Elizabeth F. Jackson, The Copyright Office’s Protection of Fair Uses Under the DMCA: Why 
the Rulemaking Proceedings Might be Unsustainable and Solutions for Their Survival, 58 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 521, 524 (2011). 
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Israel, the Philippines, and Singapore.  “Fair dealing” doctrine in 
Commonwealth countries, notably England and Canada, is clearly more 
narrow than fair use, and in keeping with the European Union 
Copyright Directive, the copyright systems of Continental countries 
confirm users’ rights via statutory exceptions and limitations rather than 
through a broad standard such as fair use.  Recent multilateral trade 
negotiations that wrap intellectual property issues into treaty form, such 
as those that preceded the recently-concluded Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (“ACTA”) and those that are now looking to a new Trans-
Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), would ratchet copyright protections 
upward, to extend United States norms favoring copyright owners 
across a broader international stage, rather than confirming 
internationally the balanced United States copyright regime that 
encompasses fair use. 
Against that background, fair use has received some additional 
international traction recently, and the Madisonian separation of powers 
metaphor has not been far behind.  Whether the trend favoring 
international engagement will continue remains to be seen, but for fair 
use proponents these are both interesting and welcome developments.  
In England, the report on UK intellectual property law popularly known 
as the Hargreaves Review, conducted by the Intellectual Property Office 
and led by Professor Ian Hargreaves, was initiated in November 2010 
and completed in May 2011.30  That report called for study of ways to 
bring new flexibilities to copyright law, both in the UK and in 
alignment with European law, in view of digital technologies and 
interests in economic growth, even if those flexibilities were unlikely to 
take the form of a full-fledged adaptation of fair use as such.31  That call 
for added copyright flexibilities in the UK has been echoed by a 
powerful recent report by the Institute for Information Law at the 
University of Amsterdam, prepared by Bernt Hugenholtz and Martin 
Senftleben, advocating for exploration of room for additional copyright 
flexibilities within the framework of existing European copyright law.32  
That report relies in part on research noted above by Pamela Samuelson 
and Barton Beebe, confirming that the doctrine is more predictable than 
many commentators assume.33  (The report stops short of 
recommending European adoption of American-style fair use itself.)  A 
recent paper by Jonathan Griffiths similarly bridges the gap between 
 
30 IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GROWTH (May 2011), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf.  The British 
Government’s response to the Hargreaves Review acknowledges the need for copyright 
flexibilities.  HMGOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE HARGREAVES REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 7-8 (August 2011), available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf. 
31 HARGREAVES, supra note 30, at 47. 
32 See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN EUROPE: IN SEARCH 
OF FLEXIBILITIES (Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554. 
33 Id. at 8-9. 
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emerging interest in new flexibilities in European and UK copyright law 
and what I call Madisonian developments in fair use law described 
above.34  Griffiths suggests that in light of evidence about these 
patterns, the American fair use experience warrants consideration in 
Europe.  Bringing the question almost full circle, the Best Practices 
model itself has now begun to find an audience outside the United 
States, among documentary filmmakers in Canada, South Africa, and 
Norway.35  It seems unlikely that fair use as such will find favor in the 
formal law of any European state, but the theory of fair use that looks to 
institutional settings to ground creative production and both doctrinal 
predictability and flexibility is beginning to make a difference in the 
lives of artists outside the United States.  Madisonian fair use is being 
exported. 
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR FAIR USE 
My copyright separation of powers principle is an incomplete 
metaphor, though it seems to be useful to a degree in understanding the 
contribution of Patterns and Rewriting Fair Use and various 
developments in fair use over the last several years.  That contribution is 
no panacea for all that might ail modern copyright.  Still, the metaphor 
and the argument seem to tie together a number of somewhat disparate 
themes in copyright reform. 
One is the role of incrementalism and the common law in the 
development of copyright law and the role of institutional choice with 
respect to intellectual property law generally.  My earliest work on fair 
use argued that the surest way to provide a stable cultural “space” for 
adaptation and critical re-use of copyrighted material was to embed the 
law of fair use in an explicit common law framework.36  I expect that 
future scholarship and policymaking will focus renewed attention on 
institutional questions of that sort.37 
 
34 See Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece—The Liberation of European Copyright 
Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COMM. L. 87 (2010). 
35 See Sarah Sklar-Heyn, Note, Battling Clearance Culture Shock: Comparing U.S. Fair Use and 
Canadian Fair Dealing in Advancing Freedom of Expression in Non-Fiction Film, 20 CARDOZO 
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (2011) (Canada); Leif Ove Larsen & Torgeir Uberg Nærland, 
Documentary in a Culture of Clearance: A Study of Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward 
Copyright and Fair Use Among Norwegian Documentary Makers, 8 POPULAR COMM. 46 (2010), 
available at https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/1956/4138/3/Larsen%20og%20%20Narland.pdf 
(Norway); Sean M. Flynn & Peter A. Jaszi, UNTOLD STORIES IN SOUTH AFRICA: CREATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 
(2010),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654025 (South Africa).  See also Amira Dota, 
Niva Elkin-Koren, Orit Fischman-Afori & Ronit Haramti-Alpern, Fair Use Best Practices for 
Higher Education Institutions: The Israeli Experience, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 447 
(2010) (describing the production of a code of best practices in fair use for use by Israeli 
universities and faculty). 
36 Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1025, 1138-39 (1998). 
37 Recent examples of scholarship in this vein include thoughtful proposals to reform fair use by 
using tools of the administrative state.  See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 1087 (2007); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 
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Two is interest in copyright reform that takes place simultaneously 
within the legal system itself and beyond it.  Theories and doctrines of 
fair use will continue to engage the narratives of copyright doctrine and 
the practices of the people whose lives are touched by it.  The 
Statements of Best Practices are of a piece in this sense with Creative 
Commons, as an organization, as a movement, and as a set of licenses 
for copyrighted works. 
Three is the role that language and metaphor play in constructing, 
interpreting, and applying the law.  Patterns itself addressed the role of 
metaphor and language in identifying and justifying the groups whose 
patterns are recognized by fair use.  The Madisonian separation of 
powers principle is, in its present copyright context, a simple metaphor.  
In broader copyright debates, “piracy” is both metaphor and 
phenomenon.38  At their best and most useful, metaphors reveal both 
strengths and weaknesses in the worldly phenomena that they represent.  
Here, let me conclude with one of each.  Metaphorical Madisonianism 
at its best may force us to confront the limits of the economic 
instrumentalism that justifies much if not all of modern copyright, while 
still rejecting (as the U.S. Supreme Court has done) application of the 
labor/desert theory of John Locke.  That, I think, is all to the good.  An 
institutional approach to copyright may be justified by appeals to groups 
as sources of creativity, but I also suspect that this explanation and 
justification is incomplete.  The metaphor also reveals that institutional 
approaches to creativity and innovation (and to other things) may 
conceal the many ways in which individuals are included in and 
excluded from patterns, practices, and collectives; the different ways in 
which individuals may benefit and lose as they interact within the 
collective; and the variety of emerging, novel, and often independent 
ways in which individuals create new things and rework old ones.39  In 
the American experience, the original Madisonian Constitutional 
framework oriented to governance institutions was quickly 
supplemented by a Bill of Rights oriented in many ways to individuals.  
James Madison himself once wrote of copyrights and patents that “[t]he 
utility of this power [of Congress to enact legislation addressing the 
rights of authors and inventors] will scarcely be questioned. . . . The 
public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of 
individuals.”40  The future of fair use may lie in both law and society 
fully realizing and institutionalizing the ambition of that promise. 
 
 
(2009). 
38 For discussion of the origins and uses of piracy, see ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2009). 
39 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate 
Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2133 (2011) (struggling thoughtfully with intersecting themes 
of sex and gender in practices of creativity by “vidders”). 
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288-89 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
